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Canada’s Parliament houses a lower elected chamber, an upper unelected chamber
(the Senate), and the Queen (Constitution Act, 1867, s 17 [CA1867]). The framers
of Canada’s Constitution Act, 1867 had a vision for the Senate as a complementary,
deliberative body bringing regional perspectives to national issues and genuine
powers of oversight and sober second thought. To realize this vision, the Senate
was given the power to initiate legislation (except money bills) and a legislative
veto (CA1867, ss 53, 91). At the same time, it was denied a popular mandate. The
Governor General appoints all senators and can appoint some additional senators to
overcome a deadlock between the chambers (CA1867, ss 24, 26, 32). This method
of selection was to signal the Senate’s political subordination, while promoting
institutional independence. To reinforce independence, the framers gave senators
life tenure and required that they be propertied men of a certain age (30 years) and
means (net worth of $4,000) (CA1867ss 23(1),(4), 29). These criteria, still in place
today, were to insulate senators from corruption, while giving the country’s elites
some control over the popular class.
The Senate was also to be representative. Seats in the House of Commons were
distributed by population, but seats in the Senate were distributed equally to
Canada’s three (now four) regions (CA1867, s 22). Senators must live in the
province for which they are appointed and own property there (CA1867, s 23(3),(5)).
This regional equality, a lynchpin of Confederation, reassured the least populous
provinces that their interests would be represented at the federal level.
Re-configuring the Senate
The constitutionally entrenched features of the Senate have remained stable since
1867. Calls for Senate reform started just after Confederation, with little success.
The number of seats grew as provinces and territories joined the federation and a
retirement age, 75, was added (CA1867, ss 22, 29(2)). In 1929, women became
eligible for appointment (Edwards v AG of Canada, [1930] AC 124) and, in 1982, the
Senate was granted an oversight role in constitutional amendment. All other features
remain intact.
The Senate needs change, but the impulse to reform is stifled by the reluctance
of officials to open the constitutional amending formula. Any entrenched feature of
the Senate can be changed only by formal constitutional amendment, as governed
by Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. Part V prescribes which legislative bodies
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must consent to which types of amendments (Constitution Act, 1982, ss 38, 41,
42, 43, 44 [CA1982]) The Supreme Court recently clarified these formulae in its
unanimous opinion in the Senate Reference (Reference re Reform of the Senate,
2014 SCC 32 [Reference]). It provided that Parliament can unilaterally reform the
Senate only if the change does not alter the Senate’s fundamental nature and
role. Any proposal making a “qualitative difference”, like limiting senatorial tenure
or establishing consultative elections, requires the consent of Parliament and a
substantial segment of the provincial legislatures (i.e. two-thirds, representing 50%
of the population) (CA1982, ss 38, 42(1)(b); Reference at paras 50-83). Other
proposals, like abolition, that fundamentally alter the constitutional architecture and
amend the Part V procedures require unanimous consent.
The Debates
The Court’s opinion in the Senate Reference clarified many questions regarding the
‘how’ of Senate reform. Debate about the ‘what’ remains. Consider three particularly
sticky issues.
Regional Representation
Canada’s Senate has 105 seats. Each region – the West, Ontario, Quebec, and
the Maritimes – has 24 seats, which are then distributed to the provinces. Outside
the regions, Newfoundland has six seats and the territories have one each. On this
distribution, two provinces have 24 seats, two others have ten, five have six seats,
one has four, and the territories have one each. The result is that some of Canada’s
least populous provinces have the same number of seats, or more, than the most
populous ones. Proposals for reform run the gamut, from rearranged versions
of regionality to equalizing the provinces, but any change will require substantial
provincial consent (CA1982, s 42(1)(c)) and as such is politically impossible.
Constitutional Compact
In Canadian constitutional law, two versions of a “compact theory” have been
articulated. Each is reflected in debates about the Senate and its reform. The first
version conceives of the federation as the result of an agreement among all the
provinces. One consequence of this view is the belief that federal institutions should
reflect the equal standing of all provinces. One can understand arguments for an
“equal” Senate in this light. The second version understands the Canadian federation
as the result of an agreement among founding peoples. One version of this view,
prevalent in the francophone literature on federalism, posits that Quebec is the locus
of political authority for one of the founding peoples and the primary site in which
that people’s culture can be sustained. Adherents of this version see a threat in any
proposal for Senate reform that would erode Quebec’s representation and influence.
In this respect, the “founding peoples” version of the compact theory is in direct
tension with aspirations to equality, a tension that carries over into contemporary
debates about Senate reform.
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Democratic Deficits
It is widely agreed that the Senate’s constitutional configuration stains Canada’s
public institutions. In the name of democracy, critics target the existing method of
selecting senators, long senatorial tenure, and the failure of the Senate to achieve
its aims. To critics, the selection process is opaque and reduces to prime ministerial
fiat; long tenure is inconsistent with other Western democracies and shields senators
from accountability; and the Senate is unnecessary to protect regional or provincial
interests. Critics have many proposals for enhancing legitimacy. They call for wider
input into the selection process, reducing the Senate’s power, fixed terms, allocating
seats to Aboriginal people, creating a “Triple E” Senate, and abolition. Recently,
the government proposed legislation limiting senatorial terms and institutionalizing
what happens in Alberta, namely provincial senatorial elections that inform the Prime
Minister’s recommendations. Of course, after the Supreme Court opinion, these
proposals are effectively off the table.
Re-imagining Possibilities
The will to reform the Senate is mired in constitutional fatigue and political obstacles.
As a result, the most promising strategies for reform might exist outside the formal
amending process. The federal Liberal party has announced one possibility. To
break party discipline in the Senate, Liberal senators will no longer be members of
the national party’s caucus. Despite this new practice, without cooperation from all
national parties, it is unlikely to overcome the long-standing culture of partisanship.
Another strategy is to modify the Senate’s internal operations. We can imagine
a Senate that aims towards popular deliberation and consultation. Such a model
would take up the Senate’s strengths of reflective inquiry, while enhancing legitimacy
through public participation, without opening Part V.
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